Fourth Circuit leaves intelligence officers’ termination injunction in place
A divided panel found that intelligence officers were likely to succeed in asserting due-process protections for reassignment consideration and internal appeals.
The Fourth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction requiring two intelligence agencies to follow their termination regulations for career employees challenging their proposed dismissals. The July 2 opinion, amended July 7, concerns the process afforded to employees, including consideration for reassignment and internal appeal. In a separate published order on November 3, the full court declined to rehear the case. The underlying litigation was not finally decided by either action.
The employees alleged that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence intended to remove them without honoring procedures in the agencies’ own regulations. Before the proposed terminations, the employees had been temporarily assigned to work related to diversity, equity, inclusion or accessibility. A federal court in Alexandria granted interim relief. The agencies argued on appeal that statutes giving intelligence directors broad authority over national-security terminations foreclosed review and that the employees lacked a protected property interest.
Judge Nicole Berner distinguished review of the directors’ discretionary personnel decisions from review of the constitutional procedures leading to those decisions. Relying on Webster v. Doe, the majority held that the statutory grant of discretion did not bar these constitutional claims. The majority read the termination regulation as providing an entitlement to consideration for reassignment and to internal appeal in the circumstances presented. It concluded that the district court could find a likelihood of success and that interim relief was appropriate because those procedural opportunities would be difficult to restore after the fact.
Judge Stephanie Thacker joined Berner. Judge Paul Niemeyer dissented. He read the statutes and regulation as preserving discretion for the agency directors and disputed that appeal and reassignment procedures created protected property interests. He also disagreed with the injunction’s scope and the findings on irreparable harm. On November 3, Berner wrote separately in support of denying rehearing, and Niemeyer dissented from the denial.
A preliminary injunction is designed to preserve the parties’ positions while a case is litigated. The majority accordingly reviewed the district court’s findings about likely success, irreparable harm and the proper scope of interim relief under deferential standards. It found a sufficient basis to protect the opportunities to appeal and to be considered for reassignment before the agencies moved forward. That leaves the agencies’ ultimate personnel decisions and the merits of all the underlying claims to the procedures and litigation that follow.
The court also left open the separate doctrinal question whether a claim based solely on an agency’s failure to follow its own regulations is constitutional in nature. The majority rested this ruling on the employees’ particular due-process theory and the interests it found in the termination regulation.
The precedential panel opinion resolves the interlocutory appeal. It decides constitutional and statutory questions relevant to whether the preliminary injunction can stand, leaving final liability to the underlying case. The practical distinction is that broad discretion over whether to keep an employee does not, under the majority’s reading of these regulations, necessarily resolve what process the agency must provide first.