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Opinion analysis

South Carolina assault provision remains a crime of violence for federal supervision

A later ruling about different state offenses did not displace binding Fourth Circuit precedent on the statute used to grade the supervised-release violation.

Albert V. Bryan United States Courthouse in Alexandria, Virginia.
Context photograph. dctim1 · CC BY-SA 2.0. See Image Credits.

The Fourth Circuit left a two-year federal revocation sentence in place after holding that its prior precedent on one form of first-degree assault and battery in South Carolina still governs. The October 15 opinion, later amended, addressed whether a separate state high-court ruling had undermined the circuit’s conclusion that the offense qualifies as a crime of violence under the federal Sentencing Guidelines.

Jesse Owens was serving supervised release after a federal firearms conviction. After the probation office alleged new violations, the district court found that Owens’s conduct constituted first-degree assault and battery under S.C. Code § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i). It treated that conduct as a Grade A violation, the most serious category under the relevant policy statement, revoked his supervision and imposed the statutory maximum of two years. Owens argued on appeal that the court had calculated the advisory range using the wrong grade.

Chief Judge Albert Diaz explained that the federal classification turns on the elements of the applicable offense. The first-degree statute lists alternative offenses, so the panel focused on the provision covering an offer or attempt to injure by means likely to cause death or great bodily injury. In United States v. Mack, the circuit had classified that provision as a crime of violence. Owens relied on a South Carolina Supreme Court decision holding that some related offenses can be committed recklessly, but that decision did not interpret the provision he was charged under. Diaz concluded that it supplied no basis to disregard Mack.

Owens had not raised this argument in the district court, so the circuit reviewed for plain error. Even if there were some tension between the opinions, the trial court had followed binding circuit precedent on the same provision. A later panel also lacks authority to overrule that precedent on its own. The result concerns this specific state-law alternative and matters because the classification can change the advisory range for federal supervision.

The classification issue was about the Guidelines, not whether the federal appellate court could enter a conviction for the reported state offense. A federal court deciding revocation grades conduct by the offense it constitutes, and the guideline definition asks whether use, attempted use or threatened use of force is an element. This is why the court separately considered whether recklessness would suffice under the particular provision and whether the statute defined alternative offenses.

The state decision Owens cited addressed criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature and second-degree assault and battery. The panel observed that different elements can introduce different mental states even when offenses share similar names. Those differences prevented the circuit from treating the state decision as an answer to the elements question here.

Judges Paul Niemeyer and DeAndrea Gist Benjamin joined Diaz with no separate opinion. The published, precedential decision resolves the guidelines challenge and affirms the revocation judgment without further proceedings on remand.

Source Documents

  1. Official Fourth Circuit opinion PDF
  2. South Carolina Code, Title 16, Chapter 3
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