Virginia high court says a court pleading must identify the basis for attorney fees
A construction company won its breach-of-contract counterclaim but lost its fee request because the pleading did not identify why the fees were recoverable.
Winning a construction contract dispute did not entitle Premier Homes Group to recover its attorney fees when the request did not identify its basis in the appropriate pleading. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the intermediate appeals court on July 30 and held that the trial court correctly applied Virginia’s pleading rule.
Pinnacle Flooring Solutions and Premier each accused the other of breaching the flooring subcontracts. Premier won at trial on its counterclaim. Its pleading had asked the court to award fees and incorporated parts of Pinnacle’s complaint that contained the contracts. The contracts included a clause allowing fees in certain circumstances. Counsel’s later emails identified the clause more specifically, but Premier had not amended the counterclaim to identify that basis.
Justice Junius P. Fulton III explained that Rule 3:25(b) requires a demand as well as an identification of the basis for recovering fees, typically a contract or statute. The Court of Appeals had treated the incorporated contracts as enough to give Pinnacle notice of the reason for the request. The Supreme Court held that notice through exhibits or later correspondence did not satisfy a pleading requirement on this record.
The distinction matters because a fee demand can survive or fail separately from the claim to which it relates. The rule allows a party to seek leave to amend when the necessary demand was not adequately pleaded. The opinion found Premier had not pursued that step. The ruling addresses fees in the case and clarifies how the state rule applies even when the opposing party might be able to work out which contract term a claimant intends to invoke.